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has been reached, it is the primary
responsibility of senior military leaders
to fight the war in accordance with jus
in bello norms. Convincingly, through
historical references and extrapolations,
Dubik demonstrates that successful
wars have been won not only on the
basis of tactical excellence but also on
the strategic merit that both civil and
military leaders have provided. Dubik
insists that just war proponents have
focused exclusively on the tactical
dimension of jus in bello, thereby
omitting the strategic facet of waging
war, including the necessary public
legitimation, determination of end-state
goals, provision of logistical support,
and preparation for reconstruction.
The five principles laid out—continuous
dialogue, final decision authority,
managerial competence, war legitimacy,
and resignation—presuppose the classic
benchmarks of proportionality and
discrimination in jus in bello, but these
additional five strategic components fill
in the gap of what is tragically lacking
in the standard just war formulation.
When senior civil and military leaders
fail to optimize strategic coordination
of war via a dynamic partnership
involving intense dialogue, the costs
of war escalate in both economic and
human-casualty terms, rendering
those leaders who squandered the war
efforts morally culpable. Unforgettably,
General Dempsey in his foreword
asserts that one of the most important
and haunting lines from the entire
book consists of these few words: “The
difficulty of conditions that may mitigate
responsibility does not erase it” (p. viii).
Dubik’s critique is not a replacement
of Walzer’s ideas defending just war
but rather an addendum that augments
the value of strategic planning and
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cooperation between civil and military
leaders. On reflection, a reader might
question whether the strategic aspect
of jus in bello might not exist already,
to some extent, within jus ad bellum,
considering military advisement as
part of the moral calculation of proportionality and probability of success.
Additionally, the reader might wonder
whether the acceptable range across the
military operations continuum would be
determined best if the strategic dialogue
and robust collaboration between
civil and military leadership that Dubik
champions went on not only as part of
jus in bello but at every stage of war and
peace. For instance, the war-waging
principle of continuous dialogue also
might apply to jus ante bellum (justice
before war: strategic planning to shape
fragile states so as to prevent war),
jus ad bellum (justice in going to war:
debating all nonkinetic and military
options), and jus post bellum (justice
after war: planning for reconstruction)
to achieve jus pax (just peace).
Overall, Dubik’s strategic supplement
to the category of jus in bello is a
legacy that posterity will credit respectfully to the experience and wisdom of
a distinguished scholar and warrior.
EDWARD ERWIN

Never Call Me a Hero: A Legendary American
Dive-Bomber Pilot Remembers the Battle of Midway, by N. Jack Kleiss, with Timothy Orr and
Laura Orr. New York: William Morrow, 2017. 336
pages. $26.99.

June 4, 1942, stands out as one of the
most pivotal moments in American
naval history. The events of that day
continue to be analyzed, scrutinized, and
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debated down to the smallest details.
However, few authors can speak with
the authority of Captain Jack Kleiss,
USN (Ret.). In his memoir of his naval
service, Kleiss gives special attention
to the part he and the rest of Scouting
Squadron 6 played in the battle of
Midway. The resulting narrative is
compelling and offers a new perspective
on the battle. Most histories of the battle
try to explain the extended air battle as
a complete picture, but Kleiss eschews
this approach. It is his own story that
the reader follows through the battle,
with his personal triumphs and tragedies
sharing the stage with the overall
description of the desperate victory.
Kleiss was a 1938 Naval Academy
graduate from Kansas who joined
Scouting 6 in 1941 after his mandatory two years in the surface fleet and
flight school. His telling of his story is
authoritative throughout, owing to an
array of primary resources, including
his wartime diary, letters, logbooks, and
unit after-action reports. Although he
penned his memoir some seventy years
after Midway, the account is exceedingly detailed and surprisingly candid.
Kleiss was a lieutenant (junior grade)
at Midway and served as Scouting 6’s
second flight commander, directly
behind squadron commander Lieutenant Earl Gallaher. From that position,
Kleiss put bombs on target on Kaga
during the momentous afternoon air
strike of June 4. Later that afternoon, he
put his bombs into Hiryu to finish off
the Japanese carrier force, and he also
would get a hit on Mikuma on June 6.
For his actions throughout the battle, the
Navy awarded Kleiss the Navy Cross.
By telling the story from his perspective
in the cockpit, Kleiss avoids many of the
discussions of strategy and operations
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that dominate the historiography of the
battle. However, he specifically cites
and particularly disagrees with Walter
Lord’s Incredible Victory (Harper and
Row, 1967) as a flawed work that has
mis-steered the narrative of the battle
and perpetuates the misperception that
the remarkable victory was largely the
product of luck. “I prefer to believe we
won the battle because we knew our
stuff just a little bit better than our foes
knew theirs. If luck played any role at
all, it came in the fact that a few of us
pilots lived to fly another day, while
many others died. Luck determined who
survived, not which side won the battle”
(p. 280). Additionally, Kleiss opposes the
notion that the victory can be credited
mostly to the admirals in charge of
the action, Frank Jack Fletcher and
Raymond A. Spruance. Kleiss considers
the plans for the battle to have been
“overly elaborate” (p. 280) and deems the
pilots responsible for the victory. Kleiss
credits the tactical proficiency of the
aviators and the mental flexibility of the
squadron leaders and air group commanders with taking advantage of the
situation and delivering a sudden, lethal
strike—in spite of the admirals’ plan.
If June 4, 1942, stands out to the public,
it haunts Kleiss and colors the entire
tone of his retelling of the battle.
“As the twenty-first century dawned,
the Battle of Midway wouldn’t leave me
alone. To answer the flurry of questions
accurately, I had to relive the battle
over and over again. I had to come
face-to-face with memories I’d long
since buried. I had to recall the smell
of the salt air, the roar of the wind as it
rushed past my cockpit, the sight of red
flames coming up from the exploding
ships, and other such vivid sensations
for which words will never do justice.
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I had to summon the faces of friends
I’d lost and the sadness that tortured
me as I whiled away the aftermath
of the battle in my bunk. Today, that
day—Thursday, June 4, 1942—hovers
over my shoulder like an annoying
friend, constantly chirping in my ear,
‘I am the most important day of your
life.’ It will not leave me alone” (p. xiv).
Kleiss’s writing (in which he was
assisted by Timothy and Laura Orr
of Old Dominion University and the
Hampton Roads Naval Museum) is easy
to read even though it is laced with a
slew of technical details, along with his
vivid recollections. Anyone wishing
to get a better insight into the way in
which a scouting squadron operated in
the early part of the war should consult
this memoir as the first step. However,
the emotion carried in the pages gives
the work the weight that a secondary
source must struggle to provide. It is one

thing to understand academically the
meaning of the sacrifice of the torpedo
bombing squadrons, but it is another
to read Kleiss’s account of parting with
his best friend on the flight deck of
Enterprise, with Kleiss in tears, knowing
he will never see his friend again.
Never Call Me a Hero challenges the
narrative of Midway that is dominated
by the admirals and operational details.
Kleiss freely admits that his conclusion
is biased toward the evidence of his
own experiences. However, the book
constitutes a remarkably detailed
and comprehensive account from
one of the key actors in the events of
Midway. It stands out as an exceptionally
well-rounded military memoir that is
worthwhile for both the general reader
and the serious student of the battle.
ANDREW J. ROSCOE
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